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The autumn of our anguish has passed, and we are still
confused about how to describe the use of military force in
Afghanistan. We are torn between using the language of justice
and the language of war. Is this an attack by private
individuals, a case of a singl6 terrorist writ large? If the mass
killings of September 11 are the crimes of individuals-Islamic
fundamentalist versions of Timothy McVeigh-then we can
think about arresting them and bringing them to "justice." The
mantra of the Bush team, "bringing justice to them and them to
justice," has seeped through the media and become part of the
standard discourse of people thinking and writing about the
war.
Yes, the war. What else should we call the military response
to one of the most serious attacks ever executed on the soil of
the United States? From its initial pronouncements, the White
House has found it easy to invoke the rhetoric of armed
aggression and collective self-defense. This has been a war in
anyone's book except perhaps in the minds of traditional
international lawyers who claim that you cannot fight a war
against a nonstate organization.'
Justice and war: how well do they sit together? The former is
about restoring moral order in the universe. The latter is about
securing the survival and achieving the partisan goals of a
particular nation. And yet we want to think that this war, in
particular, is about pursuing justice. The targets and the
arguments, however, are different, depending on whether the
agenda is justice or war. If our goal is doing justice, then we
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School.
1. The falsity of this is evident in the recognition of a de facto state of war
during the Civil War in Bosnia in the 1990s. See Karadzic v. Kadic, 70 F.3d 232,237
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
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should focus on the individual culprits. If the point is to
execute and win a war, then the primary concern should be our
military objectives. The discourse of war suppresses the
identity of particular actors in the aims of a collective military
force. We were not concerned about the individual Japanese
pilots who returned safely from the attack on Pearl Harbor.
They were not criminals but rather agents of an enemy power.
They were not personally "guilty" for the attack, nor were their
commanders, who acted in the name of the Japanese nation.
Yet somehow we think things are different today. Individual
soldiers cannot lose their identity in a collective movement.
They remain potentially liable to be brought to "justice" for
their actions. We should ponder whether this is a coherent and
consistent way of thinking about armed conflicts in our time.2
The arguments of justice are retrospective. They aim to set
the scales aright. If we have lost five thousand people, the
principles of retribution, or justice in punishment, require that
our attackers should too. The principles of warfare, however,
are entirely prospective. The way to see the difference is to
suppose that the entire infrastructure of the terrorist movement
suddenly surrendered or to imagine that they credibly pledged
never to attack again. Would we have any justification for
harming a single soul? Yes, in the pursuit of justice. No, in
waging war.
In addition to our conceptual dance around the poles of
justice and war, other metaphors have entered our conceptual
space since September 11. Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued
that the proper analogy is between the attackers of September
11 and the pirates of old.3 I see no appeal to this analogy except
that the word "piracy" is mentioned in the Constitution as a fit
object of Congressional penal legislation.4 Pirates rob for loot;
they seek lucre on the high seas, where no state can claim
territorial jurisdiction. The presumed enemies of September 11
have plenty of cash; they act not for profit, but for the sake of
2. I consider the possibility of prosecuting combatants for war crimes in
violation of international criminal law infra note 14 and accompanying text.
3. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2001, at A23 ( "Al Qaeda members are international outlaws, like pirates,
slave traders or torturers.").
4. Congress has the power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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glory and their conception of God. They commit crimes on
national territory, where courts should be operating. True, the
prosecution of pirates has some resonance in international law.
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, all states,
including the United States, can punish piracies committed on
the high seas.5 If the United States acquires custody over bin
Laden or his top lieutenants, however, the government would
have no problem indicting them for conspiracy to commit
murder in the state of New York. We have little need for an
analogy to pirates to justify jurisdiction for murder committed
on the territory of the prosecuting state.
Equally inapt is the frequent analogy to Al Qaeda as
"outlaws."6 Outlaws inhabit a twilight space outside the legal
order, and they are subject to being shot at will. The idea of
killing enemy soldiers on the spot is compatible neither with
the pursuit of justice nor with the laws of war. The outlaw is
subhuman, undeserving of minimally decent treatment. I do
not think we really want to make that claim about terrorists.7
Nor does it make sense to flatter terrorists by associating them
with romantic outlaws who retreat from society to live,
metaphorically, with Robin Hood in Sherwood Forest. The
purpose of thinking legally about the events of September 11
should be to help describe the danger we confront and to
provide a justification, so far as possible, for the shared
sentiment that the use of force is an acceptable response.
Unfortunately, we are in a state of collective confusion, not
knowing whether to favor the ideas of justice or the principles
of war, to adopt the analogy to piracy, or to resort to branding
the enemy as "outlaws." Our conceptual waffling has become
dangerous, for at the same time that we cannot articulate what
we are doing, we believe strongly that we must be doing the
right thing. The Presidency, the media, and most people one
meets, it seems, now participate in the great patriotic fervor
that has gripped the United States. I have no objection to
5. See id.
6. See Slaughter, supra note 3.
7. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1950) ("Modem American
law has come a long way since the time when outbreak of war-made every enemy
national an outlaw, subject to both public and private slaughter, cruelty and
plunder.").
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patriotism, 8 and I think it is proper to describe our state of
military engagement as a war. This description, however, is
clearly not shared by those who insist on thinking of the
conflict as the pursuit of justice, the searching for pirates, or the
liquidation of outlaws. We cannot agree on what we are doing,
other than to affirm that it is the right thing to do! With this
degree of conceptual fusion, and, one might add, arrogance, we
run the risk of committing great moral and legal error.
A sign of error appeared on November 13 when President
Bush issued an order establishing military tribunals to
prosecute enemy terrorists who come into our custody.9 Civil
libertarians have criticized the order as a deprivation of basic
constitutional rights, such as an independent court, a jury trial,
an appeal to independent judges, and a right to have full access
to the evidence used to support a conviction.10 The Military
Order deprives individuals of all these rights, and the critique
of these repressive procedures is clear to anyone trained in the
law." The most disturbing fact, however, is that the President
and his Cabinet are fully aware that they are cutting back on
basic rights of due process, and yet they proceed.
In the move to establish these tribunals, we can understand
the peculiar advantage of trying to think of the military
operation in Afghanistan as both the pursuit of justice and the
execution of war. The military tribunals look like a means to
bring culprits to justice. The Military Order purports to
8. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 101-24 (1993).
9. See Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Military Order].
10. See Nat Hentoff, Terrorizing the Bill of Rights, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 2001,
at 32; see also Alan Dershowitz, Bring Him to Justice in the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2001, at B13. Kudos to William Safire who was the first to blow the whistle on the
tribunals:
Misadvised by a frustrated and panic-stricken attorney general, a
president of the United States has just assumed what amounts to
dictatorial power to jail or execute aliens .... We are letting George W.
Bush get away with the replacement of the American rule of law with
military kangaroo courts .... In an Orwellian twist, Bush's order calls
this Soviet-style abomination "a full and fair trial."
William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31.
11. It is disquieting, however, to hear so many people express sympathy with
the current curtailment of civil liberties. See Pam Belluck, Hue and Murmur Over
Curbed Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,2001, at B8 (reporting on the views of Laurence
Tribe and Michael Dorf).
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guarantee "a full and fair trial"12 with the right to assistance of
counsel. Yet a similar tribunal would be unthinkable as a way
of catching and prosecuting a Mafia chieftain or an ideological
killer like Timothy McVeigh. What is the difference with regard
to international terrorists? One is tempted to say, "It is the war,
stupid." Bombing Afghanistan supposedly creates a practical
necessity to circumvent the processes of justice that ordinarily
apply to crimes committed in the United States. As President
Bush was quoted one week after issuing the order, "the option
to use a military tribunal in a time of war makes a lot of
sense."
13
Through invoking the language of war, the President has
ignored an important principle of the law that has always
governed our military conflicts. If the "individuals" detained as
combatants engaged in fighting for the enemy, they are entitled
to treatment as prisoners of war. 4 They cannot be tried for acts
of violence that are normal and standard in fighting wars, and
they must be released when hostilities cease. As combatants
they may be liable for war crimes but not for violations of the
criminal code of the country they have attacked. Yet one can
imagine the Administration's response to this critique: "this is
not really a war; this is bringing them to justice." This is the
great advantage of conceptual confusion. When it suits its
purposes, the administration justifies its actions as the pursuit
of justice; if the justice argument fails, the move is to think in
the language of war and collective self-defense.
We see both of these arguments interwoven in the "findings"
that provide the basis for the Military Order. On the one hand,
there is an emphasis on the "individuals acting alone and in
concert" who "have carried out attacks on the United States,"
diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on
citizens and property at home. 5 The purpose of the order,
however, is not to punish these perpetrators of the past, but
rather to "protect the United States and its citizens."'
6
12. Military Order, supra note 9, §§ 4(c)(2), 4(c)(5), at 57,835.
13. Paul Leavitt & Kevin Johnson, Bush Says Military Tribunals Necessary "In Time
of War," USA TODAY, Nov. 20,2001, at 5A.
14. See Exparte Qurin, 317 U.S. 1, 34 (1942) ("Lawful combatants are subject to
capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces.").
15. Military Order, supra note 9, § 1, at 57,833.
16. Id., §1(e), at 57,833.
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The constitutionality of the proposed tribunals is far more
complicated than meets the eye. To analyze the issues properly,
we should take a closer look at the Military Order in light of
two cases in which the Supreme Court upheld military
tribunals, namely, Ex parte Quirin,1 7 which upheld the tribunal
based on the Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt on
July 2, 1942;18 and In re Yamashita,19 which upheld the tribunal
invoked by Lieutenant General Wilhelm Styer, the post-war
commander in the Philippines. Both of the tribunals in question
sentenced men working for the Germans and the Japanese,
respectively, to death by hanging. If these cases are sound
precedents for the Military Order, the order is clearly
constitutional. We should be mindful, also, of the decision in Ex
parte Milligan20 in which as early as the Civil War, the Court
established the important principle that military authorities
must defer to civilian courts in areas where the latter are
functioning and can exercise jurisdiction.2' Against the
backdrop of these precedents we shall find that the Military
Order does not fare well, and that neither Quirin nor Yamashita
provides a basis for upholding the proposed tribunals as
constitutional.
The Military Order contains findings of fact, a determination
of the persons subject to the order, procedures for detaining
these persons, and finally, the procedures for trying them "for
any and all offenses triable by military commission."' In order
to grasp the full significance of the details in the lengthy
Military Order, which consists of some 1800 words, let me
establish some points of comparison by setting forth the
presidential order upheld by the Supreme Court in Quiin
17. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
18. Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. § 309 (1938-1943), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 906
(1994).
19. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
20. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
21. The Milligan principle was upheld and applied in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946), which held that the Governor of Hawaii had no congressional
or constitutional authorization for declaring "martial law" and displacing the
civilian courts with military tribunals.
22. Military Order, supra note 9, § 4(a), at 57, 834.
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("Roosevelt Order"):2
Whereas the safety of the United States demands that all
enemies who have entered upon the territory of the United
States as part of an invasion or predatory incursion, or who
have entered in order to commit sabotage, espionage or
other hostile or warlike acts, should be promptly tried in
accordance with the law of war.
Now, THEREFORE, I, FRANKuN D. ROosEVELT, President of
the United States of America, and Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, by virtue of the
authority vested in me by the Constitution, and the statutes
of the United States, do hereby proclaim that all persons
who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war
with the United States or who give obedience to or act under
the direction of any such nation, and who during time of
war enter or attempt to enter the United States or any
territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary
defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or
preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike
acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the
law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; [and
that such persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy
or maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly, or to have
any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in
the courts of the United States, or of its States, territories,
and possessions, except under such regulations as the
Attorney General, with the approval of the Secretary of War,
may from time to time prescribe.]24
Roosevelt issued this order to provide a legal basis for trying
eight men already in custody. They were German nationals
who landed in June 1942 off the coasts of Long Island and
Florida and fanned out around the United States, allegedly for
the purpose of collecting information and committing acts of
sabotage.' The FBI arrested them soon after their landing, and
there was obvious uncertainty about whether they should be
treated as prisoners of war or tried on criminal charges and, if
the latter, about whether they should get a civilian or a military
23. Because there was no executive order setting up the tribunal in Yamashita,
the case poses entirely different issues, which I take up later.
24. Proclamation No. 2561, supra note 18, at 309. The portion in brackets was
rendered invalid by Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942), which recognized the
capacity of the petitioners to seek a review of the applicability of the Executive
Order to their case and to test the constitutionality of the Order.
25. On some of the curious details of this expedition, see William Safire, Using
Military Courts Harms the War on Terror, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 27, 2001, at 9.
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trial. On the basis of Roosevelt's order they were tried and
convicted before a military tribunal, and six were sentenced to
be hanged. The primary charge was spying in violation of
Article 82 of the Articles of War then in force.
2
P
Significantly, Article 82 provided the kind of legislative
backup that was necessary to legitimize the Roosevelt tribunals
under the Constitution. The statute, dating back to 1920,
punished by the death penalty the undefined activity of spying
in time of war, and it prescribed that the offense "shall be tried
by a general court martial or by a military commission." We
can assume that for these purposes the term "military
commission" is equivalent to "military tribunal." At the time
courts martial were appropriate only for crimes committed by
members of United States armed services.2 ' Therefore, for
everyone else who commits the offense of spying in wartime,
the statute mandates a military tribunal.
Of course, Congress cannot declare every offense to be
subject to prosecution before a military tribunal and thereby
dispense with trial by jury. Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."' And the Sixth
Amendment prescribes jury trial in all "criminal cases."29 So if
the deed in question is a crime under the laws of the United
States, how could Congress authorize the President to provide
for trial by military tribunal? The argument for different
procedures in court martial cases turns, in part, on the explicit
exception in the Fifth Amendment for "cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger." One would think that one explicit
exception would exclude all others, but in Quirin, the Supreme
Court took a different line in seeking to uphold the military
tribunal used against the eight German spies. The argument
was that the constitutional provisions for jury trials were not
meant to limit the common law practices of trying some cases
26. The Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (1940), since repealed, were
directed primarily to the definition of offenses prosecuted by court martial.
27. Note that in a provision adopted in 1950 but not yet invoked (so far as I
know), the military can invoke a court martial against a prisoner of war charged
with a war crime. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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without a jury. The Supreme Court has used this reasoning
before to exempt petty offenses 0 and contempt proceedings3'
from trials by jury, and they felt justified in applying this line
of thought in this case. Quirin concluded, therefore, that it is no
more difficult than in cases of petty offenses "to continue the
practice of trying, before military tribunals without a jury,
offenses committed by enemy belligerents against the law of
war."32 As we shall see later, the key term in this formulation is
the "law of war."
After preliminary findings of fact, the Roosevelt Order
divides neatly into the following parts: (1) a claim of
presidential authority to establish a military commission; (2) a
definition of persons "subject to the law of war and the
jurisdiction of military tribunals"; and (3) a recitation of the
charges that might be brought against the persons so subject to
the tribunals. Let me compare the Bush and Roosevelt orders in
these three respects.
1. Presidential Authority. Even before considering
constitutional limitations requiring trial by jury and other
procedural protections not found in military tribunals, we have
to ask an elementary question: where does the President get his
authority to establish a tribunal and thereby circumvent the
jurisdiction of the civilian courts? In the view of the Supreme
Court, a congressional statute legitimated Roosevelt's
establishment of military tribunals to try the eight German
spies arrested in the United States.33 The remarkable feature of
the Military Order is that there is no comparable legislative
mandate requiring military tribunals for any of the crimes that
were committed on September 11. The order cites three specific
statutory sources, but none of them mandates a military
tribunal for any offense. The first, the joint resolution Congress
adopted on September 18, 2001 authorizing the President to use
all "necessary and appropriate force" against those responsible
30. The well-accepted rule is that petty offenses, punishable by less than six
months of imprisonment, are exempted, for historical reasons, from the
constitutional requirement of a jury trial. To support this proposition, the Quiin
decision relies on Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
31. The trend in the cases has been against special treatment of contempt
charges. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
32. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41 (1942).
33. Other spies were tried as well under the same principle. See Colepaugh v.
Looney, 235 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1956).
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for the September 11 attack, says nothing about tribunals or
trials.' The other two are statutory references, 10 U.S.C § 821
and § 836, which do refer to the existence of military tribunals
but which fail to mandate or even authorize a military tribunal
in any particular context.35
One is tempted to conclude that there is no legislative
authority for the President's order. In light of Supreme Court
precedent on military tribunals, however, this would be a hasty
conclusion. In Yamashita, the Court upheld the military trial
and conviction of a Japanese general charged with failing to
supervise his troops and allowing them to engage in atrocities
in the Philippines.36 There was neither a congressional mandate
nor a presidential order supporting the use of the tribunal. The
United States general in charge of the post-war occupation of
the Philippines, Wilhelm Styer, acting under General Douglas
MacArthur, invoked the tribunal based upon the military's
supposedly inherent authority.
For purposes of legitimating the Military Order, the most
significant feature of the Supreme Court's decision in Yamashita
was the casual way in which the Court's seven-vote majority
justified the proceeding in a military tribunal. Justice Stone's
opinion invokes a provision of the Articles of War -apparently
a predecessor to 10 U.S.C. § 821, which the Military Order
cites-that refers to the existence of military tribunals. This
reference was sufficient to lead Justice Stone to write that the
statute "incorporated, by reference... commissions created by
appropriate military command .... It thus adopted the system
of military common law applied by military tribunals. .. , 7 If
a commander in the Pacific can set up his own military tribunal
and operate under a common law of military offenses, then
surely the President, as Commander in Chief, can do the same
thing.
Yet there is a critical difference between the situation in
34. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces
Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launced Against the United
States, Pub. L. No. 107-40,115 Stat. 224 (2001).
35. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994) provides that if military tribunals exist, they have
concurrent jurisdiction with courts martial; 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1994) gives the
executive branch the authority to deviate, when "praticable" from the Federal
Rules of Evidence for military courts, including military tribunals.
36. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
37. Id. at 7-8.
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Yamashita and the circumstances underlying the proposed
Military tribunals. The offenses committed in the Philippines
were not subject to prosecution under American law in an
American courtroom. Perhaps they could have been tried in the
Philippines-and, in the future, in the International Criminal
Court 3S-but there was no sense in which General Styer was
trying to take a case away from the civilian courts in the United
States. It was either prosecution in his tribunal or no American
initiative at all.
This is not true regarding those complicitous in the attacks of
September 11. They are liable for violations of American law,
and therefore any attempt to prosecute them in a military
tribunal requires an argument for why the suspects are not
entitled to be tried, with full constitutional guarantees, in a
Manhattan courtroom.
When there is this kind of conflict between military and
civilian jurisdiction, the burden of justifying trials by military
tribunals requires something much different from the
argument, made in Yamashita, that the case is governed by the
"system of military common law." What is required is a
rationale for military jurisdiction analogous to the argument
made for subjecting members of the armed forces to court
martial jurisdiction. There must be something about the status
of the offenders that justifies taking the case away from the
civilian courts. This brings me, then, to the second problem in
the Military Order: the definition of the class of persons subject
to military tribunals.
2. Persons Subject to the Military Tribunal. There are several
models for the legitimate filtering off of classes of people and
the denial to them of the constitutional protections of Article HI
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The primary model is
military jurisdiction by court martial, which is defined in great
detail in the Uniform Code of Military Justice 9 and tested
repeatedly in litigation against constitutional norms.40 We have
38. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
39. 10 U.S.C. 801-946 (1994).
40. Compare Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (wife charged with killing solider
husband in England held not subject to court martial jurisdiction) with Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (wife charged with killing husband in Germany held
properly convicted under German law as applied by a military court).
645
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noted the constitutional basis for this exception for members of
the armed forces and others closely associated to the military.
A second model is the classification made by the Roosevelt
Order in 1942 and upheld in Quirin, namely, agents of nations
with which we are at war acting as "unlawful combatants" in
committing violations of the laws of war. In this context, the
process of carving out an exceptional category of persons
subject to military tribunals confronts challenges on two fronts.
On the one hand, the argument is that these defendants should
be treated as ordinary defendants in civilian criminal trials
subject to the ordinary constitutional rules: if they are charged
with violating the laws of the United States and they are not
covered by court martial jurisdiction, they should be tried in
the same manner as other criminal suspects. On the other hand,
if they are agents of a foreign military organization and they
are captured, they should be treated as prisoners of war, held
in detention until the termination of hostilities. The Supreme
Court found a path between these polar extremes by classifying
the German spies as "unlawful combatants." The critical fact
was that they entered the United States in civilian clothes and,
therefore, could not be classified as combatants identified with
an enemy army. This status justified an analogical extension of
court martial jurisdiction.
A third model is provided in the Yamashita case, namely,
officers and soldiers in enemy armies who commit crimes that
fall outside the scope of American civilian jurisdiction.
The military tribunals imagined in the November 13
Executive Order conform to none of these three models. They
are directed against all non-citizens engaged, directly or
indirectly, in international terrorism.4 ' Not only does the
lumping together of all foreigners vastly exceed standards of
relevance, but it also invokes a method of classification-citizen
versus foreigner-that has no reasonable bearing on the
supposed objective of protecting the United States against
international terrorism. In the cases emanating from World
War II, there were several United States citizens convicted by
military tribunals-if they spied for Germany, the fact that they
were Americans was irrelevant.42
41. Military Order, supra note 9, § 2(a)(1)(ii), at 57, 834.
42. See Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1956).
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has sought to achieve
equal protection for aliens under state law, and although some
inequalities are tolerated under federal law, the rationale for
those disabilities would hardly imply that the non-citizens
were per se subject to different rules and different
constitutional principles from those applicable to citizens.
43
To grasp the implications of the Military Order, imagine that
Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski had been foreigners and
that after their killings, they tried to flee to Canada or Mexico.
It would follow from the Military Order that they should be
tried, without benefit of constitutional protections, by a
military tribunal.4 It seems obvious that this discrimination
against foreign defendants would be unconstitutional.
Perhaps someone might argue that their actions did not
amount to terrorism as we now understand the term. In fact,
the concept of terrorism remains difficult to cabin in a general
definition. Serious reflection about the concept would lead to
treating McVeigh or Kaczynski as terrorists as easily as we
would apply the concept to the aggressors of September 11.
The federal statutes have tried to stake out the contours of
the concept of terrorism, but the results are not encouraging.
The standard definitions of both international and domestic
terrorism are found in 18 U.S.C. § 2331, as amended by the 2001
USA PATRIOT Act.45 The basic definition of "domestic
terrorism" now reads:
The term "domestic terrorism" means activities that-
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
43. The States may not discriminate against aliens in education, see Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), or in welfare benefits, see Graham v. Richardson, 404 U.S.
365, 372 (1971) (considering aliens as a class a "discrete and insular" minority for
whom heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate), but the federal government
derives some power of distinction based on its capacity to control immigration,
see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (holding it permissible to deny Medicare
benefits to non-citizens). There is no basis for thinking that this authority to treat
aliens differently extends to any of the procedures guaranteed in criminal cases by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
44. For further details on the concept of international terrorism, see infra notes
47-48.
45. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802,115 Stat. 272,376 (2001).
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(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primari, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
Terrorism becomes international if, as the statute provides,
there is a significant international component in the location of
the crime, the intended victims, or the place of asylum.47
In order to generate a sound definition of terrorism or any
other concept, one should begin with a few paradigm cases that
everyone agrees constitute the core instances of the concept.
One would think that the events of September 11 would
exemplify terrorism. However, a close reading of the legislative
definition suggests, surprisingly, that it may not cover the
attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Part (A),
which requires a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States is satisfied, but part (B), regarding the motive of the
violence, is not so easily established. Was the purpose of the
September 11 attack "to intimidate or coerce" the American
public or to "affect the conduct of government"? One can say
that the purpose of bombing Hiroshima was "to intimidate and
coerce" the Japanese to surrender, but was this true about the
attack on the Word Trade Center? Clearly, there was no
expectation of surrender. In fact, no one knows what the
masterminds of the attack wanted to achieve. The only
apparent motive was to kill as many "infidels" as possible.
That is not same thing as intimidating people for a political
purpose. A better account of terrorism would stress not the
element of coercion or intimidation, but just the opposite:
"striking terror in the hearts of people" by their not knowing
how to respond to the prospect of ongoing attacks.48 Even with
46. Id. § 802(a) (5), 115 Stat. at 376.
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(c) (1994), as amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 802(a), 115
Stat. at 376 (defining international terrorism as violent acts that "occur totally
outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means
by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or
intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum").
48. I am indebted to Herbert Morris for this clarification of terrorism, but
another colleague, Steve Sheppard, disagrees with this assessment and in a
personal conversation, which I quote with his permission, he offered this
inimitable definition of terrorist violence: "it must scare the living shit out of
people and instill fear that it will happen again."
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a better definition, however, the concept of terrorism remains
contested. There is an undeniable political element in the use of
the term. Terrorism is never what we do (Hiroshima, Dresden),
only what they do.
Thus we have an Executive Order designed to apply (1) just
to foreigners who (2) engage in international terrorism. The
first factor has no rational relationship to a group that might be
properly targeted in the interests of American national security.
The second factor builds the commission of criminal action into
the definition of jurisdiction (an obvious circularity) and is too
vague and contested to be taken seriously as a legitimate basis
for exempting military tribunals from the constitutional
protections prescribed in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Even before turning to the question of the charges to be
heard in the military tribunals proposed in the Military Order,
we have to conclude that the tribunals would be
unconstitutional.
Under the leading precedents, the President has no apparent
authority to take these crimes away from the civilian courts,
and the criteria governing persons subject to the order are both
unconstitutionally discriminatory and excessively vague.
3. Charges Subject to Trial in Military Tribunals. There is much
to be learned about the law of war from examining the Military
Order's understanding of the law that would apply. The order
refers vaguely to "violations of the laws of war and other
applicable laws."49 The other laws are presumably the statutes
defining crimes against the United States, as implied by the
current definition of terrorism in the USA PATRIOT Act.50 In
this conflation of two kinds of charges, we see the rhetorical
advantages of mixing the conceptual frameworks of war and
justice. If this is war, then the charges should be limited to
violations of the laws of war. If this is the pursuit of justice,
then it would be appropriate to recognize "other applicable
laws" defining criminal liability. The implication of the statutes
defining crimes against the United States, however, is that
absent a sound constitutional exception, the trial must proceed
according to the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
49. Military Order, supra note 9, § 1(e), at 57,833.
50. See Pub. L No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272 (2001).
649
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
There might be some solace for defendants under the
Military Order if the potential charges were limited to crimes
defined by the statutes of the United States, but there is little
reason to think that the Bush Administration will confine its
pursuit of "justice" to laws on the books. Yamashita
demonstrates, to our chagrin, that aggressive tribunals can
invent new offenses under a vaguely defined "law of war" that
is part of a "military common law."
These offenses under the common law of war are so vaguely
defined that they could not possibly meet the criteria of fair
notice applied in criminal proceedings. 5' No one quite knows
what the term "law of war" means. We do assume that the law
of war is part of the law of nations and Congress has authority
to define "Offenses against the Law of Nations," 52 which means
that Congress could define the law of war. There was a time
when Congress took this task seriously, but since World War II,
it has largely ignored the field. 3
In the four-year period from Quirin to Yamashita, a subtle
transformation in the law of war started to take form. Prior to
Word War II, violations of the law of war typically implied
something like unfair fighting, typified by the crime of crossing
enemy lines in civilian clothes and transmitting back
information. This is essentially the crime charged against the
eight German spies tried and convicted in Quirin. After World
War II, beginning with the Nuremberg proceedings and the
Japanese war crime trials, the "law of war" took on the
connotation of war crimes that violated basic principles of
morality and decency.' There was no violation of such
principles by the Germans who spied in the United States-
Americans would surely have done the same thing in enemy
territory. In Yamashita, we begin to encounter the idea that the
law of war is expressed in large part in war crimes, including
51. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (finding no fair
warning that trespass statute would apply to civil rights demonstrators); but cf.
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (upholding Chicago ordinance
prohibiting "gang" loitering).
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 10.
53. So far as I can tell, the only crime in the law of war still on the books is the
successor to the spying provision invoked in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See
10 U.S.C. § 906 (2000).
54. Significantly, the Supreme Court never used the term "war crimes" prior to
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1.
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brutality against civilians and prisoners of war.55
The way to see the difference between these two bodies of
law, both called the law of war, is to ask: between the offenses
in Quirin and Yamashita, which would be subject to prosecution
in the proposed International Criminal Court? The answer is
immediate and revealing. It would never occur to anyone to
prosecute the eight German spies as war criminals before the
International Criminal Court, 6 though the behavior of General
Yamashita would readily qualify as a war crime. 7 This is a
remarkable shift in emphasis from "the law of war" as a set of
rules about fair fighting to the "law of war crimes" as a set of
norms about decent behavior toward civilians and prisoners of
war.
58
This shift in the nature of the law of war brings into relief the
particular subtlety of joining the idioms of justice and of war in
the public rationale for the war in Afghanistan. There is a sense
in which those who were complicitous in the aggression of
September 11 were guilty of war crimes by engaging in the
large-scale killing of civilians, and it would make sense "to
bring them to justice" before an international court or even in
an American civilian court, in light of the current jurisdiction in
federal courts over war crimes committed against American
nationals.5 9 This view, paradoxically, requires an affirmation
that the state of armed conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban
is in fact a "quasi-war." War crimes occur only in the course of
collective armed conflict, international and sometimes intra-
national.' They are not simply criminal actions by individuals,
55. War crimes were tried prior to World War H, but no case reached the
Supreme Court that addressed the legal aspects of prosecuting a war crime in the
modem sense. On the historical aspects of war crimes, see ARYEH NEIER, WAR
CRIMES (2d ed. 1992); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL
ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (3d ed. 2000).
56. The word "spy" does not appear in the Rome Statute, and there is no
offense that comes close to the activities for which the German spies were
executed.
57. The liability of commanders for atrocities committed by their men is
recognized in Rome Statute, supra note 38, § 28(a).
58. According to a Lexis search of Supreme Court opinions, the term "war
crime" in the current sense was not used prior to the opinion in In re Yamashita,
327 US. 1 (1946).
59. 18 U..C. § 2441 (1994) (prior to 1997, the crime was called a "grave breach
of the Geneva Conventions").
60. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, § 8(b) ("international armed conflict"); id.
§ 8(c) ("armed conflict not of an international character"). On the collective nature
of war crimes, see George P. Fletcher, Romantics and Liberals at War: The Problem of
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even by conspiracies of individuals. If we affirmed the conflict
as legally akin to a war, we could readily support the liability
of Al Qaeda operatives as war criminals.
Thus, it would be possible to join the ideas of justice and war
in charges of war crimes against those responsible for the
September 11 attacks. The appropriate place to bring these
charges would be an international tribunal established by the
United Nations by analogy to the International Criminal
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. There would be policy
reasons, in addition, for favoring an international tribunal. The
neutrality and international participation would bestow on the
judgments much greater credibility than a partisan in the war
could claim for itself.
If this ideal remains beyond our grasp, the second-best
solution is prosecution in the state and federal courts of the
United States. The problem is that these courts have to rely on
defined state and federal offenses, which include war crimes
only for the murder of American nationals. A federal
prosecution would ignore the multinational nature of victims
killed in the September 11 attacks.6'
A third possibility, at least for those persons we are willing
to regard as prisoners of war, is to invoke court martial
jurisdiction under a 1950 innovation,62 apparently not yet
invoked, that permits courts martial to try prisoners of war for
war crimes.
The worst prospect is the military tribunals as proposed in
the Executive Order of November 13. Not only would these
tribunals lack credibility and severely curtail the rights of
criminal defendants, but their mere existence would also
generate constant legal challenges, and we should not be
surprised if the entire procedure is eventually declared
unconstitutional.
Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
61. See Fletcher, supra note 60.
62. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994).
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